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REQUEST FOR SUPREME COURT TO RETAIN CASE
Appellant respectfully requests the Supreme Court retain this appeal in the
post-conviction because

can definitively answer,

it

ultimately asks a question that only the

t0 Wit,

Supreme Court

What the Supreme Court would have done

in the

direct appeal.

In short, in the original criminal case involving a misdemeanor DUI, the on-

duty prosecutor attempted t0

call

the on-call magistrate t0 obtain a warrant for a

blood draw, but could not reach the magistrate.

At the hearing on the motion

to

suppress, the on-duty prosecutor described his attempts and then testified that the

next day he spoke with the magistrate and learned the ringer was off on his

cell

phone. Defense counsel objected and had that reason struck from the record.

The Supreme Court granted review
its

opinion in State

Supreme Court

v.

Chernobieff,

in the original direct appeal

and issued

166 Idaho 537 (2016). While affirming, the

stated:

The State has an

obligation to provide a functional

and

reliable

system

warrants in circumstances like these, both during regular
hours and through the night and on weekends. When an on-call
magistrate is unable to be reached by law enforcement, the State has
the burden of showing why that is the case and that good cause exists
for the unavailability. Here, the State sought t0 present evidence as t0
the reason for the magistrate's unavailabilitv, but defense counsel
objected and the evidence was stricken from the record. With n0 such
evidence in the record, the Court presumes that the trial court
for obtaining
office

ruled correctly. Poole

v.

Davis, 153 Idaho 604, 607, 288 P.3d 821, 824

(2012).
Id. at p.

541 (emphasis added).

The instant appeal

is

from the summary dismissal of the petition

for post-

conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance 0f defense counsel for objecting to the

evidence of the magistrate’s unavailability (which showed there was not good cause)

and asserting that had defense counsel not objected and moved
evidence from the record that the Supreme
conviction in the direct appeal.
t0

Of

strike the

Court would have reversed the

course, n0 other court can definitively speak as

What the Supreme Court would have done,

Court retain this case.

t0

so Appellant requests the

Supreme

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction and Nature of the Case

Daniel Chernobieff (hereinafter Appellant/Petitioner and/or Mr. Chernobieff)
appeals from the

summary

dismissal 0f his petition for post-conviction relief based

0n ineffective assistance 0f counsel.
In the underlying criminal case, Petitioner was charged With misdemeanor

DUI. He was represented by retained counsel Jacob D. Deaton (hereinafter
defense counsel),

Who has

since unrelatedly resigned from the Idaho State

trial 0r

Bar in

lieu of disciplinary proceedings.

Defense counsel brought a motion in the magistrate court to suppress the
results 0f a warrantless blood

exigent circumstances after he

draw Which the

was unable

t0

on-call prosecutor

had based on

reach the on-call magistrate to obtain

a search warrant.

The

on-call prosecutor testified at the

later learned the reason

ringer

had been turned

motion t0 suppress hearing that he

he could not reach the on-call magistrate was because the
off

0n the magistrate’s

cell

counsel objected to this evidence and successfully

phone. Incredibly, defense

moved

t0 strike

it.

defense counsel did not even argue that the lack of a back-up system in

showed a lack
Petitioner

0f good cause.

The magistrate denied the motion

entered a conditional guilty plea,

Further,

Ada County
to suppress,

and the matter was eventually

appealed

all

the

way up

t0 the

Idaho Supreme Court.

affirmed, holding, relevant here, While
for the magistrate’s unavailability,

it

it

was the

had

to

state’s

The Idaho Supreme Court
burden

presume the

t0 prove

trial court

good cause

ruled correctly

because there was n0 such evidence in the record because defense counsel objected

and had

it

stricken.

Petitioner brought a petition for post-conviction relief in the magistrate court

asserting this

was cognizable

ineffective assistance 0f counsel, to Wit, that the

denial of the motion t0 suppress would have been reversed but for defense counsel’s

performance since the evidence stricken established there was not good cause
the magistrate’s unavailability.

Counsel’s objection and striking 0f the evidence

were based 0n ignorance of the law because he argued the
warrant

is

ability to obtain a search

not a relevant factor for exigent circumstances, Which

t0 the controlling law,

McNeely

v.

for

is directly

contrary

Missouri, 569 U.S. 141, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013).

The magistrate court summarily denied the

petition. Petitioner

appealed to

the district court sitting as an appellate court Which affirmed, finding no ineffective
assistance 0f counsel because the decision t0 object

Appellant

asserts,

however,

that

the

was a

district

strategic one.

court

only

reached that

conclusion by mis-stating trial counsel’s arguments which apparently led the court
t0 believe that trial counsel objected so as t0

make.

make an argument he

did not actually

Statement of the Facts and Course 0f Proceedings

The

facts

and procedure important

t0 this petition are for the

established and are succinctly set forth in the
appeal, State

v.

Supreme

most part well

Court’s opinion in the direct

Chernobieff, 166 Idaho 537 (2016):

On September

11,

2013, at around 11:00 p.m., Idaho State Police
Sly responded t0 a request for assistance from

Corporal Matthew
another officer Who had pulled Chernobieff over in a traffic stop. Upon
arrival, Corporal Sly noticed the odor 0f an alcoholic beverage, that
Chernobieff‘s eyes were "glassy and bloodshot," and that his speech
was "slow and lethargic." Corporal Sly also noticed that Chernobieff
was agitated and appeared to have difficulty answering questions.
Based upon these observations, Corporal Sly asked Chernobieff t0
perform standard field sobriety tests, but Chernobieff refused.
Consequently, Corporal Sly placed Chernobieff under arrest for
suspicion of driving under the inﬂuence ("DUI") and placed him in the
patrol car. In the car, Corporal Sly played the audio version 0f the
administrative license suspension form for Chernobieff and began the
fifteen minute wait period required for a breath test. However,
Chernobieff refused the breath test. Corporal Sly then contacted the
on-call prosecutor for assistance in obtaining a warrant for a blood
sample. The prosecutor asked Corporal Sly to transport Chernobieff to
the jail, Where a conference call would be set up With the on-call
The prosecutor then
magistrate t0 obtain a search warrant.
Over
attempted t0 contact the magistrate.
unsuccessfully
call
ten
the
the
prosecutor
attempted
t0
approximately
minutes,
magistrate between three and five times and left one or two voicemail
Unable t0 reach the magistrate to obtain a warrant,
messages.
the prosecutor directed Corporal Sly t0 perform a blood draw due t0
exigent circumstances.
Corporal Sly contacted the phlebotomist t0
perform a blood draw, and the test results indicated Chernobieff’s
blood alcohol content was 0.226.

The State charged Chernobieff With DUI With an excessive blood
alcohol content. Chernobieff filed a motion to suppress, asserting that
the warrantless blood draw violated his rights under both the United

The magistrate court denied
States and Idaho Constitutions.
Chernobieff‘s motion, finding that the exigent circumstances exception
t0 the warrant requirement applied under the specific facts 0f this
Subsequently, Chernobieff filed a conditional guilty plea,
reserving his right t0 appeal the denial 0f his motion t0 suppress.
Chernobieff timely appealed to the district court, Which affirmed the
magistrate court's decision. Chernobieff again appealed and the Idaho
Courts of Appeals affirmed. Chernobieff sought, and the Supreme
Court granted, review.
case.

Id, at p. 539.

The Supreme Court

affirmed. Significant here, the

Supreme Court

stated:

The State has an

obligation to provide a functional and reliable system
warrants in circumstances like these, both during regular
office hours and through the night and on weekends. When an on-call
magistrate is unable to be reached by law enforcement, the State has
the burden of showing Why that is the case and that good cause exists
for the unavailability. Here, the State sought t0 present evidence as t0
the reason for the magistrate's unavailability, but defense counsel
objected and the evidence was stricken from the record. With n0 such
evidence in the record, the Court presumes that the trial court
ruled correctly. Poole v. Davis, 153 Idaho 604, 607, 288 P.3d 821, 824
for obtaining

(2012).
Id. at p. 541.

After his conviction

was affirmed 0n

direct appeal,

filed a verified petition for post-conviction relief

court. (R. p. 5-31, 32-62.)

summary

The

dismissal 0n that

state filed

same

day.

With exhibits in the magistrate

an answer and

(R.

p.

Mr. Chernobieff timely

also filed a motion for

63-64, 65-66.) Petitioner filed a

response to the state’s motion for

What

(R. p. 2.1)

the magistrate court called a scheduling conference (but

argument on the motion
(R. p. 3.)

summary judgment.

for

summary

dismissal) took place 0n

really oral

December

3,

2018.

summary

dismissal

also granted the state’s motion t0 dismiss in a

summary

The magistrate court granted the

and dismissed the

was

state’s

motion

for

petition from the bench.

The magistrate court

written order entered 0n December 18, 2019.

entered on January 29, 2019. (R.

Appellant timely

filed

(R. p. 65.)

A

separate judgment was

p. 67.)

a notice of appeal on January 29, 2019.

(R. p. 68-70, 71-

’73.)

Briefing

and

appellate court. (R.

The

oral

argument was had in the

district court issued its

Appellant timely appeals.

This citation

is to

an

p. 3.)

Opinion 0n Appeal affirming the summary

dismissal 0f the petition seeking post-conviction

1

district court sitting as

relief. (R. p. 74-84.)

(R. p. 85-87.)

the register of actions at the beginning 0f the Clerk’s Record.

ISSUE

WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT,

SITTING AS

AN APPELLATE COURT,

ERRED BY AFFIRMING THE SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF THE
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF BASED

ON INEFFECTIVE

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AFTER DEFENSE COUNSEL OBJECTED TO AND

STRUCK FROM EVIDENCE THE REASON THERE WAS NO GOOD CAUSE FOR

THE STATE’S INABILITY TO OBTAIN AN AFTER-HOURS SEARCH WARRANT

ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT, SITTING AS AN APPELLATE COURT, ERRED BY
AFFIRMING THE SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF BASED ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

AFTER DEFENSE COUNSEL OBJECTED TO AND STRUCK FROM EVIDENCE

THE REASON THERE WAS NO GOOD CAUSE FOR THE STATE’S INABILITY
TO OBTAIN AN AFTER-HOURS SEARCH WARRANT

A.

Standard 0f Review at Trial and 0n Appeal

An

application for post-conviction relief under Idaho Code § 19-4901

nature and

is

an entirely new proceeding

t0 the conviction.

prevail

in

a

Nguyen

v.

post-conviction

State,

distinct

in

from the criminal action which led

126 Idaho 494 (Ct.App. 1994).

proceeding,

is civil

the

applicant

must

In order to
prove,

preponderance 0f the evidence, the allegations upon Which the request

by

a

for post-

conviction relief is based. Id.

Summary
under I.R.C.P.

disposition

56,

is

the procedural equivalent of

with the facts construed and

all

reasonable inferences

the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Gonzales
(Ct.App. 1991).

summary judgment

v.

State,

Allegations contained in the verified petition are

made

in

120 Idaho 759

deemed true

for

the purpose 0f determining Whether an evidentiary hearing should be held.

Martinez

v.

State,

125 Idaho 844 (Ct.App. 1994).

genuine issue 0f material
but

if

fact,

the court

may

the allegations d0 not frame a

grant a motion t0 summarily dismiss,

the application raises material issues 0f

an evidentiary hearing.

If

fact,

the district court must conduct

Id.

In determining Whether a motion for

summary

disposition

was properly

granted, the appellate court reviews the facts in the light most favorable t0
petitioner

and determines Whether,

Saykhamchone

v.

State,

if

true, they

in the direct appeal of this matter, State

“On appeal

Chernobieff, 166 Idaho 537, 539 (2016):

While acting in

its

Standard

0f

Review

of a decision rendered

v.

by a

intermediate appellate capacity, this Court directly

reviews the district court’s decision.” In

B.

entitle petitioner t0 relief.

127 Idaho 319 (1995).

As stated by the Supreme Court

district court

would

re:

Regarding

Doe, 147 Idaho 243, 248 (2009).

a

Claim

0f

Ineffective

Assistance

of

Counsel

The standard

for evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance 0f counsel is well

established, being set forth in Strickland

"benchmark

for

v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The

judging any claim 0f ineffectiveness must be Whether counsel's

conduct so undermined the proper functioning 0f the adversarial process that the
trial

cannot be relied 0n as having produced a just result."

1O

Id. at 686.

Strickland set forth a tWO-prong test Which a defendant must satisfy in order
t0

be entitled t0

performance

fell

relief.

The defendant must demonstrate both that

his counsel's

below an objective standard 0f reasonableness and that there

is

a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result 0f the proceedings

would have been
(1989); Gibson

More

v.

different.

State,

v.

Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129

110 Idaho 631 (1986).

specifically as to allegations 0f ineffective assistance 0f counsel

tactical decisions, the

(Ct.

Id. at 687-88; State

Court of Appeals explained in Stevens

v.

State,

based 0n

156 Idaho 396

App. 2013):
Court has long adhered to the proposition that tactical or
strategic decisions 0f counsel will not be second-guessed 0n appeal
unless those decisions are based 0n inadequate preparation, ignorance
0f relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation.
There is a strong presumption that counsel's performance fell Within
the Wide range 0f professional assistance.
This

1d,, p.

385-386 (internal citations omitted).

C.

The Ruling
The

conviction

0f the District Court Sitting as

district court affirmed the

relief. It

began

its

summary

an Appellate Court
dismissal 0f the petition for post-

analysis section by setting forth the background of the

claim:

The

petitioner asserts trial counsel

was

ineffective because

hearing concerning
the prosecutor was unable to reach the on-call

t0 the introduction of evidence at the suppression

the reason

Why

he objected

11

magistrate When the State was trying t0 reach him t0 obtain a warrant
for a blood draw, after the appellant had refused to undergo field
sobriety and breath testing:

The

from that night (Scott Bandy) testified at
the hearing. His testimony was substantially the same as the
officer's
about attempting to contact the on-call
police
magistrate. The prosecutor testified that he called the on-call
magistrate, Judge Mike Oths, at the judge's personal cell phone
number, Which is the judge's preferred method 0f contact. (Tr. p.
23.) The prosecutor called that number and received n0 response
and called it again t0 check he had dialed right. He had, and left
on-call prosecutor

a voicemail requesting a return call and that it was for a blood
draw search warrant. (T. p. 23.) A11 told, the prosecutor called a
certain three times and perhaps five, and left a voicemail, maybe
two. (Tr.

p. 23-24.)

The

on-call prosecutor then testified that the next day he
conferred with the magistrate and found that the ringer was off
24).

Defense counsel objected and

strike this evidence,

and the court sustained the

on his

cell

moved

to

phone. (Tr.

p.

objection. (Id.)

The on-duty prosecutor then
At that point
substantial

I

testified:

informed Trooper Sly that we had made

efforts

t0

try

and

contact

the

on-call

magistrate and that based 0n our inability to get in touch
With him, that would provide an exception t0 the warrant
requirement due to the unavailability 0f securing a
warrant in a timely fashion. (Tr. p. 24). Verified Petition
for Post—Conviction Relief at 8-9.

The petitioner relies heavily 0n this paragraph from the Idaho
Supreme Court's decision on his direct appeal:
The

district court's observation

regarding the inability t0

contact the on-call magistrate, particularly in

Where there are a number

Ada County

of magistrate judges, does raise

12

some concern. The State has an obligation to provide a
functional and reliable system for obtaining warrants in
circumstances like these, both during regular office hours
and through the night and 0n weekends. When an on-call
magistrate is unable t0 be reached bV law enforcement.
that is the case
the State has the burden of showing
and that good cause exists for the unavailabilitv. Here the
State sought to present evidence as to the reason for the
magistrate's unavailabilitv, but defense counsel objected
and the evidence was stricken from the record. With n0
such evidence in the record, the Court presumes that the
trial court ruled correctlv. State v. Chernobieff, 161 Idaho
537, 541, 387 P.3d 790, 794 (2016). (Emphasis added.)

th

The appellant submitted the transcript 0f the suppression
hearing as an exhibit. The relevant part 0f the transcript is
Where the on-call prosecutor was testifying concerning his
efforts t0 contact the on-call magistrate: "And I can tell you for
sure it was three, it could have been five [times that he
attempted to call him]. It's early morning. I did leave at least
one voice mail, maybe two. I did confer with Judge Mike Oths
the next day and found that his ringer was off 0n his cell phone."
February 4, 2014 Hearing Transcript at 24.
Trial counsel for the appellant then stated: "Objection,

move

t0

strike that as hearsay, speculation." Id.

The magistrate

know

that be

get there.

A review

ruled: "Well,

it's

-

I'll

G0 ahead."

I

don't think

it's

relevant.

sustain the objection. Took

me

I

don't

awhile t0

Id.

remainder of the hearing transcript reveals that
trial counsel focused his Witness examination and argument on
the basis that there were not exigent circumstances present t0
justify obtaining a warrantless blood draw 0f the appellant and
of the

that the State's inability to contact a magistrate t0 secure a
warrant should not suffice t0 show such exigent circumstances.

345.; See also id. at 33 ("I think this case presents a
conundrum for this court Where essentially the prosecutor made
See

id.

at

13

an attempt t0 contact the judge, several attempts, three to five
by the testimony, but then he just authorized the blood draw.

And

we're going t0 allow prosecuting attorneys t0 make good
faith attempts - I'm not saying there was anything but a good
if

faith attempt

-

but

if

that's unsuccessful t0 just authorize blood

draws[.]"
[footnote]

See Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 133 S.Ct. 15 52,
1562-63, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) ("[l]mprovements in
communications technology d0 not guarantee that a
magistrate judge Will be available When an officer needs a
warrant after making a late-night arrest
exigent
circumstances justifying a warrantless blood sample may
arise in the regular course of law enforcement due t0
Whether
delays from the warrant application process
a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is
reasonable must be determined case by case based 0n the
totality 0f the circumstances").
.

.

Opinion 0n Appeal at

The

p.

district court

.

.

.

.

5-7 (R. p. 78-80.)

then analyzed the claim as follows:

When

evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the Court
does not second-guess strategic and tactical decisions. Such decisions
cannot serve as a basis for post-conviction relief unless the decision is
shown t0 have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the
relevant law 01" other shortcomings capable 0f objective review. The
appellant must also overcome the strong presumption that counsel's
performance fell within the Wide range 0f professional assistance.

As noted by the State, trial counsel's objection prevented the
magistrate from making the inference that "the prosecutor would
never have been able to reach the magistrate that night because his

phone ringer was

off.

By

successfully objecting

and moving

t0 strike

the testimony, the magistrate was left With evaluating simply the fact
the prosecutor called three t0 five times over 10 minutes and then
stopped trying." Respondent's Brief at 19.

14

Trial counsel's decision falls Within the Wide range of professional
assistance.

The

on-call prosecutor's statement

was arguably hearsay,

and the magistrate ruled the statement irrelevant. At the time 0f the
suppression hearing there was n0 binding Idaho authority to the effect
that when an on-call magistrate is unavailable, the State has the
burden 0f demonstrating why that occurred and the burden 0f showing
that good cause existed for the unavailability.

The appellant seeks t0 find trial counsel ineffective 0n the basis 0f
hindsight, Which is impermissible. See, e.g., State v. Porter, 130 Idaho
772, 791, 948 P.2d 127, 146 (1997) ("Under the Strickland two-part
the claimant bears the burden 0f proving that counsel's
test,

performance was

deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 680, 104 S.Ct. at
2060-61. In this analysis, counsel's effectiveness must be evaluated
from the time of the alleged error, not in hindsight. Id. at 681, 104

S.Ct. at 2061.").

Supreme Court's statement in the suppression
appeal there was no authority that when a magistrate is unable t0 be
reached by law enforcement, the State has the burden 0f showing Why
that is the case and that good cause exists to excuse the unavailability.
That statement came in the direct appeal 0f this case. Trial counsel
could not have had knowledge of the statement at the time 0f the
suppression hearing. Also, as noted by the State, the appellant
presented n0 evidence as to What the magistrate would have actually
testified t0 concerning the reason he did not respond to the State's
Prior to the Idaho

efforts t0 contact

him that evening.

While the U.S. Supreme Court in Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141,
133 S.Ct. 1152 (2013), references the "procedures in place for obtaining
a warrant 0r the availability of a magistrate judge," as possible
says nothing concerning the reason why a
magistrate is unavailable as a relevant factor and does not specify 0r
indicate that the State would have the burden 0f explaining the
magistrate's unavailability and have the burden t0 demonstrate good
cause t0 excuse the magistrate's unavailability. See McNeely, 133 S.Ct.
relevant

factors,

it

at 1568 ("Although the Missouri

Supreme Court

referred t0 this case as

'unquestionably a routine DWI case,‘ 358 S.W.3d, at 74, the fact that a
particular drunk-driving stop is 'routine' in the sense that it does not

15

such as the need for the police t0 attend to
a car accident, does not mean a warrant is required. Other factors
present in an ordinary traffic stop, such as the procedures in place for
obtaining a warrant 0r the availability 0f a magistrate judge, may
affect Whether the police can obtain a warrant in an expeditious way
and therefore may establish an exigency that permits a warrantless
search. The relevant factors in determining whether a warrantless
search is reasonable, including the practical problems 0f obtaining a
warrant Within a timeframe that still preserves the opportunity t0
obtain reliable evidence, Will n0 doubt vary depending upon the
circumstances in the case").

involve 'special

facts,’ ibid.,

made a substantial effort to suppress
evidence obtained Without a warrant. The argument he made that the
unavailability 0f the magistrate was not relevant in determining
exigent circumstance may have been in error in light of the comment
made by the Idaho Supreme Court in Chernobieff, p. 541. But counsel
could not foresee that it might be error t0 exclude an explanation 0f the
Judge's unavailability in the absence of prior authority t0 that effect.
Trial counsel for the petitioner

Opinion 0n Appeal,

D.

The

p. 7-10. (R. p. 80-83.)

District

Court erred in affirming the

summarv

dismissal for post-

conviction relief

1)

The

district court misstates

and

so

misunderstands

trial counsel’s actual

argument.
In short, the district court’s Opinion 0n Appeal misstates a quote from trial
counsel and from that

argument than he

it

seems

really

misunderstanding the

to believe that trial counsel

made regarding

exigent

district court finds trial counsel

object so he could argue the theory that

made

circumstances.

made

From

that

a strategic decision to

he never actually argued.
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the exact opposite

Again, from

its

Opinion on Appeal, the

district court claims:

A

review of the remainder of the hearing transcript reveals that trial
counsel focused his witness examination and argument 0n the basis
that there were not exigent circumstances present t0 justify obtaining
a warrantless blood draw 0f the appellant and that the State's inabilitv
t0 contact a magistrate t0 secure a warrant should not suffice to show
such exigent circumstances. See id. at 3-45. See also id. at 33 ("I think
this case presents a conundrum for this court Where essentially the
prosecutor made an attempt t0 contact the judge, several attempts,
three to five by the testimony, but then he just authorized the blood
draw. And if we're going to allow prosecuting attorneys t0 make good
faith attempts - I'm not saying there was anything but a good faith
attempt - but if that's unsuccessful t0 just authorize blood draWS[.]"

As noted by the State, trial counsel's objection prevented the
magistrate from making the inference that "the prosecutor would
never have been able to reach the magistrate that night because his

phone ringer was

off.

By

successfully objecting

and moving

t0 strike

the testimony, the magistrate was left With evaluating simply the fact
the prosecutor called three t0 five times over 10 minutes and then
stopped trying." Respondent's Brief at 19.

Opinion 0n Appeal

p.

7-8 (emphasis added, footnote omitted). (R. p. 80-81.)

The underlined statement
(0r

examine a Witness

t0 secure

will

is incorrect.

At no time did defense counsel argue

t0 establish) that the state’s inability t0 contact

a warrant was insufficient to show exigent circumstances.

a magistrate
Instead,

as

be detailed below, counsel argued that exigent circumstances did not include

the state’s inability to obtain a warrant but included other kind 0f factors, Which

completely opposite of the controlling law as established in McNeely.
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is

Unhelpfully, the district court’s citation for
entire transcript. It is then

more

specific

When

it

its

underlined finding

is

the

continues and again, states:

think this case presents a conundrum for this
court where essentially the prosecutor made an attempt t0 contact the
judge, several attempts, three t0 five by the testimony, but then he just
authorized the blood draw. And if we're going t0 allow prosecuting
attorneys t0 make good faith attempts - I'm not saying there was
anything but a good faith attempt but if that's unsuccessful t0 just
authorize blood draws[.]"
.

.

.

See also

id.

at 33

("I

-

Opinion on Appeal at

However, the

p. 7. (R. p. 80.)

district court misstates the

the bracketed period and completely changes

sentence

its

When

it

cuts

it

off

meaning. Trial counsel

With

is

not

arguing about three to five attempts t0 contact a judge being insufficient to
constitute exigent circumstances. Rather, trial counsel is

making a (misguided)

separation of powers argument.

turn my argument next t0 the exigent circumstances. To my
mind the trooper articulated several facts Which he observed Which
might have led him t0 believe that my client was under the
inﬂuence 0f alcohol, but prosecutor Bandy stated one 0f the reasons
he thought there was an exigent circumstance is the natural
dissipation of alcohol. That was his testimony.
I'll

First 0f

all,

I

don’t

know

that his opinion

is

all

that relevant

because — I think this case presents a conundrum for this court
Where essentially the prosecutor made an attempt to contact the
judge, several attempts, three t0 five by his testimony, but then he
authorized the blood draw. And if we're going t0 allow
prosecuting attorneys to make good faith attempts -- I'm not saying
there was anything but a good faith attempt-- but if that's
unsuccessful to just authorize blood draws, that is the province 0f

just
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the iudicial branch, it is the province 0f vour Honor and the other
judges elected and appointed in this state. It is not 0n prosecuting
attorneys.

Suppression Hearing Tr.
Trial counsel

p. 33, 1n.

seems

to

8—p.

34, 1n. 4

(emphasis added).

(R. p. 49.)

be expressly arguing that a prosecuting attorney

can never authorize a warrantless blood draw regardless of the circumstances,
exigent or not, and

it

can only be done by a warrant issued by a judge.

Trial counsel returns t0 this

theme

Which ends rather nonsensically regardless
certainly not based on

And

any correct statement

at the very
0f

end 0f his argument,

What he actually meant and

is

0f law:

think the court should be somewhat troubled 0r cautious in
allowing prosecutors t0 make good faith attempts but then to
unilaterally authorize search warrants. That is dangerous if
prosecutors can unilaterally authorizing warrants if they can’t get in
front 0f a judge.
I

23—p.

Tr. p. 36, 1n.

Next

is

37, 1n. 3. (R. p. 50.)

the theory raised by the state that by objecting

it

prevented the

magistrate from making the inference that the prosecutor would never have

been able

to

reach the magistrate at

all

because the ringer was

off

(which

is

not

even true, discussed further below) and instead by objecting the magistrate was
left

This

With evaluating just the three t0 five attempts t0 reach the magistrate.
is

simply a

made up theory by

the state and can be shown With certainty

not t0 be trial counsel’s theory 0r strategic decision by the simple fact that
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it

is

based on the premise that the availability of the magistrate
is

is

relevant,

Which

the opposite 0f Which trial counsel believed and argued.

Defense counsel’s arguments show that he

obviously did not

know

the law

existing at the time related t0 exigent circumstances. Defense counsel not only kept

out relevant and meritorious evidence, but also argued the exact opposite 0f the
controlling law

When he argued

that exigent circumstances only applied t0 a

defendant/police scenario and not the state’s ability t0 get a warrant.

What

defense counsel actually argued at the motion to suppress hearing

regarding exigent circumstances was the following:

There were n0 exigent circumstances in this case. If this court is t0
determine that the inabilitv of the prosecution t0 obtain a warrant bV
contacting a iudge iustifies exigent circumstances, I think that, (a),
that is an improper factor to consider. EXigent circumstances has to d0

With the factors 0f the case, of the

officer

and the defendant.

Prosecutor Bandy said well one 0f the reasons was natural dissipation
0f alcohol.
McNeely makes it clear that that cannot be one of the
exigent circumstances. The prosecutor in her argument said, well,
0f the exigent circumstances is we couldn’t get a warrant. I don’t think
that is a proper factor.

w

The exigent circumstances has

do With Whether 0r not the defendant
is intentionallv delaving the process, it as [sic] t0 do With other factors
about Schmerber Which the prosecutor cites Whether there’s going t0
be a medical examination, Whether this person is going t0 have the
opportunitv t0 make an arrest 01" Whether there’s going to be
subsequent hospitalization of those items. And none 0f the factors are
t0

present.

To
a

my mind what

lot

has been argued before this court today was we saw
And
0f signs they were intoxicated and time was a wasting.
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McNeely says that that is not the proper
have something more than just time.
Suppression Hearing Transcript,

p.

35

(R. p.

you have

analysis, that

50), 1n.

1—p.

36, 1n. 4

t0

(emphasis

added).

To conclude,
magistrate

trial

made by

counsel never, ever, argued that the effort into reaching the

the state

was

He never argued

did not exist.

insufficient

and therefore exigent circumstances

that the three t0 five attempts t0 phone the

magistrate were insufficient. Rather,

counsel argued only, directly contrary t0

trial

the controlling law 0f McNeely, that the state’s inability to obtain a warrant

improper factor

to consider.

Thus, the district court’s conclusion that
decision is error

and

is

trial

counsel objected as a strategic

completely unsupported by the record.

support an insufficiency 0f effort

argument

not object so that the magistrate would not

With only evaluating the three to

that

was

five

make an

inability t0 obtain a

was not done

trial

inference

make

to

that

counsel clearly did

and would instead be

attempts because he again did not argue

insufficient for exigent circumstances

argument that the

It

since trial counsel did not

argument, but instead argued the very opposite. Likewise,

left

was an

and

it

was

directly contrary t0 his

warrant was not relevant.
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2) Trial counsel’s

of the law,

Which

is

the earlier discussions in

its

grudgingly concedes at the end that “the argument he
0f the magistrate

been in error in
Chernobieff,

p.

erroneous,

it

was not relevant

is

based 0n ignorance

decision,

the district court

light of the

that the unavailability

may have

comment made by the Idaho Supreme Court

about

incorrect about the case that

argument that the

argument being

trial counsel’s

made

it

so,

it

was McNeely, not

inability t0 obtain a

relevant to determining exigent circumstances

warrant was not

was indisputably erroneous

NcNeely.

The majority opinion

in

McNeely stated as

follows:

Although the Missouri Supreme Court referred
“unquestionably a routine DWI case,” 358 S.W.3d, at
particular drunk-driving stop

to

this

case

as

74, the fact that a

“routine” in the sense that

does not
involve “‘special facts,’” ibid., such as the need for the police t0 attend
Other
t0 a car accident, does not mean a warrant is not required.
factors present in an ordinary traffic stop, such as the procedures in
place for obtaining a warrant 0r the availabilitv of a magistrate judge,
maV affect whether the police can obtain a warrant in an expeditious

an

and therefore

maV

is

an

it

exigencv that permits a
warrantless search. The relevant factors in determining Whether a
warrantless search is reasonable, including the practical problems of
obtaining a warrant Within a timeframe that still preserves the
establish
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in

9. (R. p. 82.)

district court is finally correct

Chernobieff. Trial counsel’s

made

in determining exigent circumstance

541.” Opinion 0n Appeal, p.

While the

it is

reviewable because

is

NcNeely.

despite

Next,

performance

after

opportunity t0 obtain reliable evidence, Will n0 doubt vary depending
upon the circumstances in the case.

McNeely, 569 U.S. 164, 133

The same point

S. Ct.

1568 (emphasis added).

also appeared earlier in McNeely:

We by no means

claim that telecommunications innovations have,

will,

or should eliminate all delay from the warrant-application process.

Warrants inevitably take some time for police officers 0r prosecutors to
complete and for magistrate judges t0 review.
Telephonic and
electronic warrants may still require officers t0 follow time-consuming
formalities designed to create an adequate record, such as preparing a
duplicate warrant before calling the magistrate judge. See Fed. Rule
And improvements in communications
Crim. Proc. 4.1(b)(3).
technology d0 not guarantee that a magistrate judge Will be available
When an officer needs a warrant after making a late-night arrest.
technological developments that enable police officers t0 secure
warrants more quicklv, and d0 so Without undermining the neutral
magistrate judge’s essential role as a check on police discretion,
relevant to an assessment 0f exigencv. That is particularly so in this
context, Where BAC evidence is lost gradually and relatively

m
ﬂ

predictably.

McNeely, 569 U.S. 155, 133

As

S. Ct.

1562-1563 (emphasis added).

least in Lexis, the relevance 0f delays in the

warrant application process

actually a headnote:

HN6

Search

&

Seizure, Exigent Circumstances

EXigent circumstances justifying a warrantless blood sample may arise
in the regular course 0f law enforcement due t0 delays from the

warrant application process.
McNeely, 569 U.S.

HN 6.
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is

Defense counsel could not have been more wrong When he objected to and

moved

t0

strike

the

relevant

exceptionally

regarding the

evidence

practical

problems in obtaining a warrant in this case and instead argued to the court that
the inability to obtain a warrant

was not a proper

factor to consider.

Obviously,

had defense counsel understood the law, he would not have objected
admission 0f evidence

Which established there was no good cause

magistrate’s unavailability.

Likewise, defense counsel

would have argued that the lack

0f a

backup system

is

Who understood

to

the

for

the

the law

also contrary t0 good cause

(more 0n this below).
In Lankford

v.

Arave, 468 F.3d 578

(9th

Cir.

2006),

the Ninth Circuit

discussed cognizable ineffective assistance 0f counsel based 0n the attorney’s

submission in a state court murder

trial of

a jury instruction based 0n federal law

rather than the directly opposite Idaho law:

As we review FitzMaurice's performance, we must refrain from secondguessing his strategies and acknowledge the "Wide range 0f reasonable
professional assistance." Id. at 689. Nevertheless, we must hold
FitzMaurice to his "duty t0 bring to bear such skill and knowledge as
render the

a reliable adversarial testing process." Id. at 688.
counsel's perspective at the time," in
at least one respect, FitzMaurice’s representation falls below the
standard of "reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689. We agree

will

trial

Even considering "conduct from

With the

district court that there

was n0 reasonable

tactical

advantage

an erroneous iurv instruction that would allow the iurV t0
give greater weight t0 Brvan's [the accomplice’s] testimonv. In this

in requiring

case, "[c]0unse1's errors

With the jury instructions were not a strategic

decision t0 forego one defense in favor 0f another.
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They were the

result

misunderstanding of the law." United States
1383, 1390 (9th Cir. 1996).

0f a

v.

Span,

’75

F.3d

error is perhaps understandable, given his limited
experience and resources, but it is constitutionally inexcusable. By
inviting a jury instruction that misstated state law and made it easier
for the jury to convict his client, counsel unwittingly undermined the
very "adversarial testing process" he was supposed t0 protect.

FitzMaurice's

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
this

We

regard his performance

agree With the district court that in
below the "range of reasonable

fell

professional assistance." Id. at 689.

Lankford,

p.

583-586

(italicized

emphasis in the

original, underlined

emphasis

added).

Our case

is

the same.

A

review 0f McNeely, the very case the parties were

arguing about, plainly showed that the ability t0 get a warrant
t0 exigent circumstances.

is

a relevant factor

There can be no legitimate strategy

to

arguing the

opposite of controlling law.
Trial counsel’s belief that the ability t0 obtain a warrant is not a factor for

exigent circumstances
Significantly,

it is

is

the complete opposite 0f the actual, controlling law.

not some esoteric point 0f law, rather,

it is

repeatedly stated in

McNeely, a case 0f Which defense counsel was aware 0f because he cited and
discussed

it.

To conclude, defense counsel here was wrong about something that he should
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not have been wrong about, McNeely.2

Thus, defense counsel’s ignorance 0f the

actual law allows his deficient performance to be reviewed.

that the district court

was a

is

wrong

And

that review shows

in its ruling that the objection (and motion to strike)

valid strategic decision since

it

was based 0n ignorance

of the then current,

controlling, law.

3)

The statement that the ringer was

While the
the ringer

was

district court did not

off

seem

to

off is

base

not hearsay.

its

decision 0n

comment was only arguably hearsay,

State noted that Appellant presented n0 evidence as to

have actually

testified to concerning the

efforts t0 contact

it

it

and stated that

did point out that the

What the magistrate would

reason he did not respond to the State's

him that evening.

Appellant did not have t0 present any more evidence about What the
magistrate would have said than What was in the transcript 0f the suppression
hearing.

This

is

because What the prosecutor represented (under oath) that the

2

Defense counsel also got the very point 0f McNeely wrong When he argued that
“Prosecutor Bandy said well one of the reasons was natural dissipation 0f alcohol.
McNeely makes it clear that that cannot be one of the exigent circumstances.” What
McNeely actually held was that the natural dissipation 0f alcohol by itself, was not
sufficient t0 establish exigent circumstances and does not d0 so categorically. As an
aside, he was likewise wrong about the defendant’s delay being a factor which can
be properly considered according to the direct appeal.
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magistrate told him

is

really not hearsay because

0f the matter asserted (although everyone

Under
off

the truth).3

That

is

the excuse he

the one that should be analyzed and

true or not. Trial counsel

it

was attempting

to rely

0n and so

does not really matter Whether

was wrong When he objected

to the

was

and order a

t0 justify his decision t0 declare exigent circumstances

warrantless blood draw.
is

it is

not being used for the truth

oath, the prosecutor volunteered the information that the ringer

0n the phone

that

assumes

it is

it

was

statement as hearsay

(and speculation).
In short, there was sworn evidence in the record, and Appellant did not need
t0

otherwise establish what the magistrate would have actually testified

Additionally,

summary

4)

the stage of the proceedings must be remembered,

dismissal,

The ringer being

and the sworn testimony

off

on the phone

There was not good cause
Appellant asserts that had

trial

is

in the transcript

was

this

to.

was a

sufficient.

not good cause for unavailability.

for the unavailability of

an

on-call magistrate.

counsel not objected t0 (and then had struck) the

testimony that the ringer was turned off on the on-call magistrate’s
3

cell

phone, that

Appellant will not address the practical considerations 0f requiring judges t0 be
witnesses in post-convictions when their statements are not really controverted.
Ironically, however, in this case, it would require one Ada County Deputy
Prosecuting Attorney t0 at least implicitly object to a different Ada County Deputy
Prosecuting Attorney’s sworn testimony as being unreliable.
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good cause for the unavailability of a judge t0 issue a warrant would not have been

shown. The ringer being
that would, for

all

off

0n a

cell

phone cannot constitute good cause because

practice purposes, create a negligence exception t0 the warrant

requirement. Being bad at obtaining a warrant cannot become a reason a warrant
is

not required.

Good cause would presumably be more

likely to

be found

if it

involved, for

instance as stated by the district court sitting as an appellate court in the direct
appeal, a failure 0f equipment

system

itself.

in a storm

01"

some other

factor not controllable in the court

In other words, something like phone lines 0r a

cell

tower being down

presumably would be considered good cause in the exigent circumstances

analysis.

The next reason good cause could not be established
defense counsel did not argue this reason)

is

in this case (of course,

the absence 0f a back-up judge 0r any

The magistrate explained When denying the motion

kind 0f redundancy system.
suppress:

At 11:00 p.m. there

is

only one on-call judge, and even if [the on-call
and get that judge up, that judge

prosecutor] were t0 call another judge

hear probable cause because the one digital
with the on-call judge. So it's kind 0f a pickle when

isn't really situated t0

recorder

you

we have

is

can't reach the on-call judge.

Suppression Hearing Transcript,

p. 41, Ins. 18-24. (R. p. 51)
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t0

While the system

t0 obtain

warrants after hours

prosecutor in a jam,

it is

a factor controllable in the court system

Regardless 0f what
this case, the lack 0f a

23 magistrates and 11

have the authority
judges, there
reliable

system

back-up judge

Nor

is

may

the on-

be the case in small counties which are not part of

back-up judge
district

is

inexcusable in

Ada County. There

judges in the Fourth Judicial District,

t0 issue a search warrant.

for obtaining

is

left

itself.

are

all of

some

Whom

Given this number 0f

I.C.R. 41(a).

no good cause excusing the obligation

is

well have

nevertheless does not provide good cause because again,

call

it

may

t0 provide a functional

and

warrants after hours because the simple solution of a

not provided.

the fact that the court only has one digital tape recorder good cause.

In the day and age Where a free app can turn any smart phone into a digital
recorder, having only one tape recorder is not only not good cause,
little effort

was put

into providing a functioning

and

reliable

system

it

shows how

for obtaining

warrants after hours.

Of
not,

course, While the state does not

it is

system,

at its peril.

if

Who bears

and when
the

loss.

In other words,
its

system

fails, it

have

if

to

have a backup system,

if it

does

the state chooses to not have a backup

must be the

state,

and not the defendant,

Here, something happened that was not intended and a

problem arose. The question

is really, like
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in tort cases

Where n0 one intended the

harm but

there

eroding Fourth

is

Amendment

protections With

exception t0 the warrant requirement,
foregoing a misdemeanor

Another
unavailability

reason
is

Who bears

nevertheless harm,

DUI
good

it

Here, rather than

the loss?

What

is

essentially a negligence

should be the state

Who bears

the loss by

prosecution.

cause

cannot

shown

be

for

magistrate’s

the

because the prosecutor ended his attempts to contact the on-call

magistrate after his preferred contact method had proved ineffective.
words, just because the magistrate’s personal
that does not

mean

it is

the only

cell

way he can be

In other

phone was his preferred method,

contacted

if

the preferred method

is

not working.

How

the on-call prosecutor went about trying t0 contact the magistrate

completely controllable factor. The state argued below that

That

a warrant from the on-call judge.

is

not correct.

it

What

is

a

did its best to obtain

the state did

was d0

one thing, t0 Wit, attempt to reach a magistrate Via his preferred method 0f contact

and then immediately stopped
insufficiency of this is easily

its

efforts

When

that

was unsuccessful.

shown by What would have been done

if

The

hypothetically,

the state needed a warrant for important dissipating evidence in a murder case.

It

cannot be seriously suggested the on-call prosecutor would have authorized a
warrantless search after the type 0f attempts in this case. Rather, a land line would

have been tried

(if

available),

and

if

the magistrate did not answer,
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it

would have

been done the old-fashioned way, the

police

magistrate’s house and knocked 0n the door until

Of

course,

had the

limit its attempts t0 reach the magistrate

summary,

it

had

the

to

the

was answered.
measure

state provided a back-up system this sort of

would presumably not have been necessary.

In

would have been sent

However, the state does not get

t0

ad not have a back-up system.

evidence

0f

the

reason

met

unavailability not been stricken, the state could not have

good cause for the unavailability 0f an on-call magistrate.
inability 0f the on-call prosecutor to obtain a

for

its

the

magistrate’s

burden

showing

Without good cause, the

warrant cannot be a factor

circumstances that allows a warrantless blood draw.

0f

for exigent

In our case, there was n0

other factor which would justify the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant

requirement.
injuries.

It

was a run

The lone

Supreme Court

of the mill

misdemeanor DUI, there was n0 wreck

factor present is the

in

same one

0r

rejected by the United States

McNeely as not enough Without more,

to Wit,

the natural

dissipation 0f alcohol over time.

Had
there

defense counsel not objected and

was n0 good cause

argued that the

ability to

moved

to strike the evidence

for the magistrate’s unavailability,

obtain a warrant

is

and instead wrongly

not a factor for determining exigent

circumstances, the

Supreme Court would have reversed the denial

suppress

should not have been denied in the

(really, it
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showing

first place).

0f the

motion

t0

Contrary t0 the complaints 0f the

district court, all this

was not some neW

law created by the Supreme Court in Chernobieff’s direct appeal that was unknown

and unknowable

at the motion t0 suppress hearing. Chernobieff just gave us

new nomenclature,
McNeely and the
It is

the relevance 0f the availability 0f the magistrate

rest

was just hornbook

came from

law.

undisputable that the prosecution has the burden to establish that an

exception exists for a warrantless search (and any defense attorney should
that).

some

know

There was even an Idaho case saying so Which concerned the exigency

exception at the time 0f the suppression hearing.
State

v.

Ward, 155 Idaho 332

The Fourth Amendment

App. 2013), explained as follows:

(Ct.

protects the “right of the people t0 be secure

in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Without a warrant,

searches and seizures Within a

home

are presumptively unreasonable.

—, —,

131 S.Ct. 1849, 1856, 179
Kentucky v. King, —U.S.
L.Ed.2d 865, 874—75 (2011); State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482, 485, 163
P.3d 1194, 1197 (2007). The State can overcome this presumption by
showing the government conduct fell Within one of the exceptions to
131 S.Ct. at 1856,
the warrant requirement. King,
U.S. at
179 L.Ed.2d at 874—75. One such exception exists where exigent
circumstances “make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that
the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394, 98 S.Ct. 2408,
2414, 57 L.Ed.2d 290, 301 (1978).

—

Id., at

,

332.

In other words,
t0 just go

it

was the

state’s

burden

t0 establish that

ahead With a warrantless search when
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it

it

was reasonable

could not reach the magistrate.

With the Fourth Amendment
words the ringer was

off

0n the [magistrate’s] cellphone were uttered,

a crystal ball t0 see the future State

reason for a warrantless search

when

rights 0f a criminal defendant at stake,

is

v.

it

the

did not take

Chernobieff decision t0 understand that said

not objectively reasonable. A11

understanding 0f the current law at that time.

By

objecting

it

took was a basic

and striking that

evidence from the record (and by not even arguing the lack of a backup system),
trial

counsel removed from consideration the very thing that

made

the warrantless

search unreasonable.
Next,

it

can be determined Without doubt that the outcome 0f the case would

have been different but

for defense counsel’s deficient

0f the warrantless blood

certainly

much was

was

BAC

literally impossible for

him

t0

to DUI-excessive.

The Declaration

0f Daniel

2. (R. p. 62.)

Without a blood alcohol content

be convicted 0f DUI-excessive, Which requires a

of at least .20. I.C. section 18-8004C.

Also, as established
t0

the results

attached to the Verified Petition for Post-

Conviction Relief as Exhibit D, para.
it

Had

draw been suppressed as they should have been, Petitioner

would not have pled guilty

Chernobieff stating as

performance.

by Petitioner’s Declaration, he would not have pled guilty

DUI, but would have demanded his right

significantly,

to a jury trial.

(Id.

para.

3.)

Even more

he would not have even been prosecuted as established by the

prosecutor herself at the hearing

When she

33

argued:

Without applying the exception, the exigent circumstances
exception to the warrant requirement, a man Who had been driving
intoxicated 0n the roads in the State 0f Idaho would not be able to be
prosecuted for his conduct.

Suppression Hearing Transcript,

p. 30, Ins. 1-5. (R. p. 48)

Thus, Petitioner has established a prima facia case 0f ineffective assistance of
counsel and this

summary

dismissal should be reversed and the case

remanded

for

an evidentiary hearing.

CONCLUSION
Wherefore, for the reasons above stated, Appellant respectfully requests the
district court’s order

summarily dismissing his petition

for post-conviction relief

reversed and remanded t0 the magistrate court for an evidentiary hearing.

DATED

this 3rd

day

0f February, 2020.

Greg S. Silvev
Greg S. Silvey

/s/

Attorney for Appellant
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